PSGuerrilla

2.29.1

Private/AD/Core/Get-ADTransitiveAttackPath.ps1

                                # PSGuerrilla - Jim Tyler, Microsoft MVP - CC BY 4.0

# https://github.com/jimrtyler/PSGuerrilla | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

# AI/LLM use: see AI-USAGE.md for required attribution

#

# Transitive attack-path engine. Where Get-ADAttackPath (ADPATH-001) reports single-hop

# control of a Tier-0 object, this chains control + group-membership edges of ARBITRARY

# length to find the shortest path from a non-privileged principal to Tier-0:

#   HelpDesk --[WriteDacl]--> CORP-Admins --[MemberOf]--> Domain Admins

# The graph is directed and every edge points "toward more privilege": A -> B means

# controlling (or being) A lets an attacker reach B's position. BFS gives the shortest chain.

#

# Path DEPTH is bounded by the collected ACL coverage: today PSGuerrilla collects ACLs on the

# six critical Tier-0 objects only, so most chains are 1 hop. The full-domain ACL collector

# (roadmap, live-gated) populates control edges over arbitrary objects and unlocks deep chains;

# this engine consumes them unchanged. The resolver below is validated for arbitrary depth.

function Resolve-AttackPathGraph {

    <#

    .SYNOPSIS

        Pure transitive shortest-path resolver over a directed privilege graph.

    .DESCRIPTION

        BFS from each source to the nearest Tier-0 target. Returns one shortest chain per source

        (fewest hops). Cycle-safe (visited set) and depth-bounded (MaxDepth).

    .PARAMETER Adjacency

        Hashtable: nodeKey -> @( @{ To=<nodeKey>; Edge=<label>; Technique=<text> }, ... ).

    .PARAMETER Targets

        Hashtable: nodeKey -> <target label>. Reaching any of these completes a path.

    .PARAMETER Sources

        Node keys to compute paths FROM (targets among them are skipped).

    .PARAMETER MaxDepth

        Maximum chain length to search. Default 10.

    #>

    [CmdletBinding()]

    param(

        [hashtable]$Adjacency = @{},

        [hashtable]$Targets = @{},

        [string[]]$Sources = @(),

        [int]$MaxDepth = 10

    )

    $results = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]::new()

    foreach ($src in (@($Sources) | Select-Object -Unique)) {

        if (-not $src -or $Targets.ContainsKey($src)) { continue }

        $visited = [System.Collections.Generic.HashSet[string]]::new([StringComparer]::OrdinalIgnoreCase)

        [void]$visited.Add($src)

        $queue = [System.Collections.Generic.Queue[object]]::new()

        $queue.Enqueue([PSCustomObject]@{ Node = $src; Hops = @() })

        $found = $null

        while ($queue.Count -gt 0 -and -not $found) {

            $cur = $queue.Dequeue()

            if (@($cur.Hops).Count -ge $MaxDepth) { continue }

            foreach ($edge in @($Adjacency[$cur.Node])) {

                $to = [string]$edge.To

                if (-not $to) { continue }

                $newHops = @($cur.Hops) + @([PSCustomObject]@{ From = $cur.Node; To = $to; Edge = "$($edge.Edge)"; Technique = "$($edge.Technique)" })

                if ($Targets.ContainsKey($to)) {

                    $found = [PSCustomObject]@{ Source = $src; Target = $to; TargetLabel = $Targets[$to]; Hops = @($newHops); Length = @($newHops).Count }

                    break

                }

                if ($visited.Add($to)) {

                    $queue.Enqueue([PSCustomObject]@{ Node = $to; Hops = @($newHops) })

                }

            }

        }

        if ($found) { $results.Add($found) }

    }

    return @($results)

}

function Get-ADTransitiveAttackPath {

    <#

    .SYNOPSIS

        Builds the AD privilege graph from collected recon data and returns transitive paths to Tier-0.

    .DESCRIPTION

        Edge sources: dangerous ACEs (principal -> controlled object) and privileged-group

        membership (member -> group). Targets: the six critical Tier-0 objects + the Tier-0 groups.

        Default/by-design principals are excluded as path sources. Returns { DataAvailable; Paths }.

    #>

    [CmdletBinding()]

    param([hashtable]$AuditData)

    $notCollected = [PSCustomObject]@{ DataAvailable = $false; Paths = @() }

    $acl  = $AuditData.ACLs

    $priv = $AuditData.PrivilegedAccounts

    $haveAcl  = [bool]($acl -and (-not ($acl -is [System.Collections.IDictionary]) -or $acl.Contains('DangerousACEs')))

    $havePriv = [bool]($priv -and $priv.PrivilegedGroups)

    if (-not $haveAcl -and -not $havePriv) { return $notCollected }

    # Final-hop impact per critical Tier-0 object (reused intent from Get-ADAttackPath).

    $impactByObject = @{

        'domain root'             = 'the domain (DCSync every hash) — Domain Admin equivalent'

        'adminsdholder'           = 'all protected groups via SDProp — persistent Tier-0 control'

        'domain controllers ou'   = 'every Domain Controller (malicious GPO -> SYSTEM)'

        'gpo container'           = 'any host where a controlled GPO is linked'

        'configuration container' = 'the forest configuration partition — forest compromise'

        'schema container'        = 'the AD schema — forest-wide persistent control'

    }

    $tier0Groups = @('domain admins', 'enterprise admins', 'schema admins', 'administrators')

    $norm = { param($s) (("$s" -split '\\')[-1]).Trim().ToLower() }

    $adjacency = @{}

    $addEdge = {

        param($from, $to, $edge, $tech)

        if (-not $adjacency.ContainsKey($from)) { $adjacency[$from] = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]::new() }

        $adjacency[$from].Add(@{ To = $to; Edge = $edge; Technique = $tech })

    }

    $targets = @{}

    foreach ($o in $impactByObject.Keys) { $targets["obj:$o"] = $impactByObject[$o] }

    foreach ($g in $tier0Groups) { $targets["grp:$g"] = "$g (Tier-0 group)" }

    # Privileged membership: which principals are already Tier-0 (to flag non-privileged sources).

    $privSids = [System.Collections.Generic.HashSet[string]]::new([StringComparer]::OrdinalIgnoreCase)

    $privNames = [System.Collections.Generic.HashSet[string]]::new([StringComparer]::OrdinalIgnoreCase)

    $sourceSet = [System.Collections.Generic.HashSet[string]]::new([StringComparer]::OrdinalIgnoreCase)

    $displayOf = @{}

    # ── Control edges from dangerous ACEs ──

    if ($haveAcl) {

        foreach ($ace in @($acl.DangerousACEs)) {

            $principal = "$($ace.IdentityReference ?? $ace.IdentitySID)"

            if (-not $principal) { continue }

            $sid = "$($ace.IdentitySID)"

            if (Test-DefaultControlPrincipal -Sid $sid -IdentityReference $principal) { continue }

            $right = if ($ace.ObjectType -and "$($ace.ActiveDirectoryRights)" -match 'ExtendedRight|WriteProperty') { "$($ace.ObjectType)" } else { "$($ace.ActiveDirectoryRights)" }

            $objName = (& $norm $ace.ObjectName)

            $fromKey = "prn:$(& $norm $principal)"

            $displayOf[$fromKey] = $principal

            if ($impactByObject.ContainsKey($objName)) {

                $toKey = "obj:$objName"

            } elseif ("$($ace.ObjectClass)" -match '(?i)group') {

                $toKey = "grp:$objName"          # control over an (arbitrary) group — full-domain-collector edge

            } else {

                $toKey = "node:$objName"          # control over some other object

            }

            & $addEdge $fromKey $toKey $right $null

            [void]$sourceSet.Add($fromKey)

        }

    }

    # ── Membership edges (member -> group); Tier-0 groups are targets ──

    if ($havePriv) {

        foreach ($entry in $priv.PrivilegedGroups.GetEnumerator()) {

            $gName = (& $norm $entry.Key)

            foreach ($m in @($entry.Value)) {

                $sam = "$($m.SamAccountName)"

                if (-not $sam) { continue }

                if ($m.SID) { [void]$privSids.Add("$($m.SID)") }

                [void]$privNames.Add((& $norm $sam))

                $mKey = if ($m.IsGroup) { "grp:$(& $norm $sam)" } else { "prn:$(& $norm $sam)" }

                $displayOf[$mKey] = $sam

                & $addEdge $mKey "grp:$gName" 'MemberOf' "member of $($entry.Key)"

                # A nested non-default group is itself an escalation surface -> consider it a source.

                if ($m.IsGroup -and -not (Test-DefaultControlPrincipal -Sid "$($m.SID)" -IdentityReference $sam)) {

                    [void]$sourceSet.Add($mKey)

                }

            }

        }

    }

    if ($sourceSet.Count -eq 0) { return [PSCustomObject]@{ DataAvailable = $true; Paths = @() } }

    $raw = Resolve-AttackPathGraph -Adjacency $adjacency -Targets $targets -Sources @($sourceSet)

    $paths = foreach ($r in $raw) {

        $srcKey = $r.Source

        $srcName = $displayOf[$srcKey] ?? ($srcKey -replace '^(prn|grp|obj|node):', '')

        $isPriv = ($privSids.Count -gt 0 -and $false) -or $privNames.Contains(($srcName -split '\\')[-1].ToLower()) -or (Test-DefaultPrivilegedPrincipal -Sid '' -IdentityReference $srcName)

        $chain = @($r.Hops | ForEach-Object {

            $f = $displayOf[$_.From] ?? ($_.From -replace '^(prn|grp|obj|node):', '')

            $t = $displayOf[$_.To] ?? ($_.To -replace '^(prn|grp|obj|node):', '')

            "$f --[$($_.Edge)]--> $t"

        }) -join '  ==>  '

        [PSCustomObject]@{

            PSTypeName         = 'PSGuerrilla.TransitiveAttackPath'

            Source             = $srcName

            SourceIsPrivileged = [bool]$isPriv

            Length             = $r.Length

            ReachesTier0       = $r.TargetLabel

            Hops               = $r.Hops

            PathType           = if ($r.Length -gt 1) { 'Transitive' } else { 'Object control' }

            Severity           = 'Critical'

            Path               = "$chain  =>  reaches $($r.TargetLabel)"

        }

    }

    # Non-privileged sources first, then by shortest chain.

    $sorted = @($paths | Sort-Object `

        @{ Expression = { if ($_.SourceIsPrivileged) { 1 } else { 0 } } }, `

        @{ Expression = { $_.Length } }, `

        Source)

    return [PSCustomObject]@{ DataAvailable = $true; Paths = $sorted }

}