checks/auth.json
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{
"domain": "auth", "checks": [ { "id": "AU-001", "domain": "auth", "title": "SMS and voice disabled or scoped to a migration group", "severityDefault": "High", "license": [], "applicableWhen": {}, "coveredBy": [ "mfa:*" ], "thresholds": {}, "evidence": [ "02-authentication-methods-policy.json" ], "pass": "!facts.smsEnabledForAllUsers && !facts.voiceEnabledForAllUsers", "remediation": "In the authentication methods policy, disable SMS and voice call, or scope them to a migration group with an end date while users move to Microsoft Authenticator or passkeys. Review who still has a phone method registered (05-auth-registration) before cutting over.", "learn": "https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-methods-manage", "deepLink": "https://entra.microsoft.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_IAM/AuthenticationMethodsMenuBlade/~/AdminAuthMethods", "narrative": "SMS and voice are the weakest second factors: SIM swaps, SS7 interception and social engineering of carriers all defeat them, and they cannot be made phishing-resistant. Leaving them enabled for all users means an attacker who needs a second factor picks the easiest one.", "frameworks": { "nist-csf-2": "PR.AA-03", "iso27001": "A.8.5", "cmmc": "IA.L2-3.5.3", "cisa-scuba": "MS.AAD.3.4v1" } }, { "id": "AU-002", "domain": "auth", "title": "Authenticator shows app and location context", "severityDefault": "Medium", "license": [], "applicableWhen": {}, "coveredBy": [ "mfa:*" ], "thresholds": {}, "evidence": [ "02-authentication-methods-policy.json" ], "pass": "facts.authenticatorEnabled && facts.authenticatorAppInformation", "remediation": "In the Microsoft Authenticator method settings, enable Show application name in push and passwordless notifications and Show geographic location for all users. Number matching is enforced by Microsoft for every tenant.", "learn": "https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-mfa-additional-context", "deepLink": "https://entra.microsoft.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_IAM/AuthenticationMethodsMenuBlade/~/AdminAuthMethods", "narrative": "MFA fatigue attacks spam approvals until the user taps one. Number matching made the tap deliberate; showing the requesting app and the sign-in location tells the user that the request from another country for an app they are not using is not theirs.", "frameworks": { "nist-csf-2": "PR.AA-03", "iso27001": "A.8.5", "cmmc": "IA.L2-3.5.3", "cisa-scuba": "" } }, { "id": "AU-003", "domain": "auth", "title": "Passkeys enabled", "severityDefault": "High", "license": [], "applicableWhen": {}, "coveredBy": [ "mfa:*" ], "thresholds": {}, "evidence": [ "02-authentication-methods-policy.json" ], "pass": "facts.fido2Enabled", "remediation": "Enable the Passkey (FIDO2) method for all users. Decide whether to enforce attestation and restrict key models by AAGUID for administrators, then roll out device-bound passkeys in Authenticator and hardware keys for administrators first (CA-003).", "learn": "https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-enable-passkey-fido2", "deepLink": "https://entra.microsoft.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_IAM/AuthenticationMethodsMenuBlade/~/AdminAuthMethods", "narrative": "Passkeys are the phishing-resistant method most users can actually adopt: no code to type, nothing to relay, bound to the site. If the method is disabled nothing else in the phishing-resistant story can start.", "frameworks": { "nist-csf-2": "PR.AA-03", "iso27001": "A.8.5", "cmmc": "IA.L2-3.5.3", "cisa-scuba": "MS.AAD.3.1v1" } }, { "id": "AU-004", "domain": "auth", "title": "Legacy MFA and SSPR policies migrated", "severityDefault": "Medium", "license": [], "applicableWhen": {}, "coveredBy": [], "thresholds": {}, "evidence": [ "02-authentication-methods-policy.json" ], "pass": "facts.policyMigrationState == 'migrationComplete'", "remediation": "Use the migration guide in the authentication methods policy to move settings from the legacy MFA and SSPR policies, verify each method is enabled where needed, then set the migration to Complete. Microsoft retires the legacy policies on its own schedule.", "learn": "https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-authentication-methods-manage", "deepLink": "https://entra.microsoft.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_IAM/AuthenticationMethodsMenuBlade/~/AdminAuthMethods", "narrative": "While the migration is in progress, three policies decide which methods a user can register and the effective result is the union of them. Finishing the migration makes the authentication methods policy the one place that matters, which is what every other check here assumes.", "frameworks": { "nist-csf-2": "GV.PO-01", "iso27001": "A.5.1", "cmmc": "", "cisa-scuba": "" } }, { "id": "AU-005", "domain": "auth", "title": "Temporary Access Pass enabled, one-time by default", "severityDefault": "Low", "license": [], "applicableWhen": {}, "coveredBy": [], "thresholds": {}, "evidence": [ "02-authentication-methods-policy.json" ], "pass": "facts.tapEnabled && facts.tapOneTimeDefault", "remediation": "Enable Temporary Access Pass, set the default to one-time use with a short lifetime, and scope it to the groups that onboard users or recover lost devices.", "learn": "https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/authentication/howto-authentication-temporary-access-pass", "deepLink": "https://entra.microsoft.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_IAM/AuthenticationMethodsMenuBlade/~/UserRegistrationDetails", "narrative": "A Temporary Access Pass is how a new user or someone with a lost phone registers a passkey without a password-only window. A reusable pass with a long lifetime is itself a credential worth stealing, so one-time use is the default to keep.", "frameworks": { "nist-csf-2": "PR.AA-01", "iso27001": "A.5.17", "cmmc": "IA.L2-3.5.3", "cisa-scuba": "" } }, { "id": "AU-006", "domain": "auth", "title": "MFA registered for every member", "severityDefault": "High", "license": [], "applicableWhen": {}, "coveredBy": [ "mfa:*" ], "thresholds": { "minMfaRegisteredPct": 100 }, "evidence": [ "05-auth-registration-summary.json" ], "pass": "facts.mfaRegisteredPct >= thresholds.minMfaRegisteredPct", "remediation": "Use the registration campaign in the authentication methods policy to nudge unregistered users, and a Conditional Access policy on the register security information action from trusted locations or compliant devices. The registration report lists who is left.", "learn": "https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/authentication/how-to-mfa-registration-campaign", "deepLink": "https://entra.microsoft.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_IAM/AuthenticationMethodsMenuBlade/~/AdminAuthMethods", "narrative": "An MFA policy only protects users who have a method registered; the rest are prompted to register at their next sign-in, which an attacker with the password is happy to do. The registered percentage is the real coverage number behind every MFA policy.", "frameworks": { "nist-csf-2": "PR.AA-03", "iso27001": "A.8.5", "cmmc": "IA.L2-3.5.3", "cisa-scuba": "MS.AAD.3.2v1" } }, { "id": "AU-007", "domain": "auth", "title": "Passwordless-capable share of members at target", "severityDefault": "Low", "license": [], "applicableWhen": {}, "coveredBy": [], "thresholds": { "minPasswordlessCapablePct": 0 }, "evidence": [ "05-auth-registration-summary.json" ], "pass": "facts.passwordlessCapablePct >= thresholds.minPasswordlessCapablePct", "remediation": "Set the target in the profile and raise it each quarter. Drive it with passkeys in Authenticator, Windows Hello for Business and hardware keys for administrators; the registration report shows who is capable and who is not.", "learn": "https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-passwordless", "deepLink": "https://entra.microsoft.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_IAM/AuthenticationMethodsMenuBlade/~/UserRegistrationDetails", "narrative": "Passwordless-capable users can sign in without a password at all, which removes the credential phishing steals. The number is reported here and compared against the target the organisation sets, since a sensible target depends on where the rollout is.", "frameworks": { "nist-csf-2": "PR.AA-03", "iso27001": "A.8.5", "cmmc": "", "cisa-scuba": "" } }, { "id": "AU-008", "domain": "auth", "title": "Every administrator has a phishing-resistant method registered", "severityDefault": "Critical", "license": [], "applicableWhen": {}, "coveredBy": [], "thresholds": {}, "evidence": [ "05-auth-registration.json", "04-role-assignments-active.json" ], "pass": "facts.adminsWithoutPhishingResistant == 0", "affected": "facts.adminsWithoutPhishingResistant", "remediation": "Issue a hardware key or a device-bound passkey to each administrator listed and have them register it, then enforce the phishing-resistant strength for admin roles (CA-003). Until they register, the policy would lock them out.", "learn": "https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/authentication/concept-authentication-strengths", "deepLink": "https://entra.microsoft.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_IAM/AuthenticationMethodsMenuBlade/~/AdminAuthMethods", "narrative": "The phishing-resistant policy for administrators (CA-003) can only be enforced once every administrator has a method that satisfies it. This check is the readiness gate: who still signs in with a push notification or a code that an adversary-in-the-middle kit can relay.", "frameworks": { "nist-csf-2": "PR.AA-03", "iso27001": "A.8.2", "cmmc": "IA.L2-3.5.3", "cisa-scuba": "MS.AAD.3.1v1" } }, { "id": "AU-009", "domain": "auth", "title": "No users on legacy per-user MFA", "severityDefault": "Medium", "license": [], "applicableWhen": {}, "coveredBy": [], "thresholds": {}, "evidence": [ "05-per-user-mfa.json" ], "pass": "facts.perUserMfaEnforced == 0 && facts.perUserMfaEnabled == 0", "affected": "facts.perUserMfaEnforced", "remediation": "Move the users listed off per-user MFA to Conditional Access policies, then disable per-user MFA for everyone. Per-user MFA cannot be scoped, reported on or combined with strengths.", "learn": "https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-userstates", "deepLink": "https://entra.microsoft.com/#view/Microsoft_AAD_IAM/AuthenticationMethodsMenuBlade/~/AdminAuthMethods", "narrative": "Per-user MFA predates Conditional Access and prompts on every sign-in regardless of risk, device or app. Users on it get MFA fatigue, administrators get no policy control, and it cannot require a phishing-resistant method. It is the tell of a tenant that was set up before 2019 and never revisited.", "frameworks": { "nist-csf-2": "PR.AA-03", "iso27001": "A.8.5", "cmmc": "", "cisa-scuba": "" } } ] } |